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ABSTRACT: Little is known about Vegetius, who wrote the military handbook
Epitoma Rei Militaris (RM), most likely for Emperor Theodosius I during the late 3rd
or early 4th century CE. His manuscript is extensive, examining a wide array of
military practices and norms that a proper Roman army should follow. The RM
covers specific tasks and responsibilities of a general, which Vegetius appears to have
drawn from earlier Roman writers, mainly those from the late Republic and early
Principate. Comparing Vegetius’s writings to those of Julius Caesar, specifically to
Caesar’s own narrative of his actions in Book I of De Bello Gallico (BG), provides
insight into how Roman ideals of good military leadership progressed through
centuries of history. This paper argues that Caesar does exhibit proper generalship
according to Vegetius, which is important because it demonstrates how Roman
military culture of the late Republic was still important for that of the late Empire.
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4
Introduction

After years of civil war during the 40s BCE, one man rose above the rest.
Julius Caesar, born around 100 BCE and fatally assassinated by the senators of Rome
in 44 BCE, died arguably as most famous man of his generation. It was appropriate to
call each emperor after him, “Caesar,” representing the tremendous impact he had on
the culture of ancient Rome. Known for his heroics in battle and generosity towards
his soldiers, he canonized his deeds through his works De Bello Gallico (BG) and De
Bello Civili.
Considering Caesar’s importance, specifically as a general, it is interesting to
study his legacy after his death. Vegetius, a writer in the 4th or 5th century CE, crafted
a military handbook for the current emperor Theodosius. His work mainly focused on
military tactics and standards for an army like those of the late Republic and early
Principate,1 the time in which Caesar lived. Given the subject of Vegetius’s work,
comparing his ideas to the deeds of Caesar would provide insight into the Roman
standards of generalship and how they passed on through each generation. Focusing
specifically on Book I of the BG, the question becomes simple: Does Caesar
exemplify the traits of an ideal Roman general as outlined by Vegetius in the Epitoma
Rei Militaris (RM)?

Review of Scholarship: Caesar
There is no lack of scholarship concerning Caesar. The past 2,000 years has
produced seemingly endless works concerning his life, battles, policies, propaganda,
etc. Scholars have also focused heavily on Caesar’s military campaigns, the makeup
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of his army, and his generalship. Diving into all the available scholarship is a
daunting task, but the following works are particularly useful for understanding
Caesar and his military writings.
Many sources concerning Caesar focus on various aspects of his military
campaigns, ranging from military concepts to specific episodes in his time as a
general. A. G. Russell covered the events that unfold in Book I in his 1935 article
“Caesar: De Bello Gallico, Book I, Cc. 1-41.” He explained who Caesar was facing
in battle (the Helvetians and Ariovistus) and outlined the decision making process
that led to his victories.2 Focusing more specifically on the Helvetian campaign,
Alvah Otis in 1914 described how other historians viewed Caesar’s actions and what
took place during the campaign itself in her work “The Helvetian Campaign. Part
II.”3 She reviewed the accounts from the historians Plutarch, Dio Cassius, Appian,
and Suetonius and noted how all essentially approved of Caesar’s decision making
concerning his actions when engaging the Helvetians.4 The terrain of Gaul played a
key role in Caesar’s ability to gain victory over the Helvetians,5 as outlined in 1911
by Mark S. W. Jefferson in his article “Caesar and the Central Plateau of France.” He
did not seek to analyze Caesar’s actions as much as he described how they were able
to take place. To do so, he covered the geography of the area from Book I in which
Caesar marched and how it affected the mobility of his enemies.6
Caesar had to deal with two mutinies throughout his career, occurring about a
decade apart in the Gallic and Civil Wars. One occurred in 58 BC and is described in
Book I, but another that is of particular interest occurred in 47 BC. Stefan G.
Chrissanthos wrote “Caesar and the Mutiny of 47” in 2001, covering the mutiny and
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how Caesar displayed himself as a leader in his own narration of the event.7 He took
quite a critical approach towards Caesar, noting of how carefully Caesar portrays
himself as the protagonist who can do no wrong.8 Although his work is at times “antiCaesar,” it also includes helpful information on how Caesar recruited troops and his
actions in leading men, as well as providing insight into how to understand Caesar’s
handling of the mutiny in 58 BC.
Plenty of sources examine who Caesar was as a man, rather than the actions
taking place in BG. For example, P. J. Cuff focused his 1957 article “Caesar the
Soldier” on arguing that Caesar was a genius commander because of his ability to
attract loyalty from men.9 He noted how Caesar starts his Gallic campaign with four
legions and finished with at least ten,10 something only a skilled general could
accomplish. This work is more pro Caesar than others, however. Nathan Rosenstein,
although not entirely critical, seeks to understand Caesar in the context of the culture
of Rome in “Caesar and Imperialist” in 2009. He notes that Caesar’s works were not
at all objective, but that was because Caesar was writing for Rome and his manner of
writing was what Romans expected from a general.11 According to Rosenstein
Caesar’s abilities and generalship were still superb, but he was not a hero as much as
a product of the Roman culture he grew up in.12
At the time of Caesar’s proconsulship of Gaul, Rome was essentially an
empire.13 Therefore, it is not wrong to understand Caesar’s actions as acting on behalf
of an imperialist state. Sherwin-White’s 1957 article “Caesar as an Imperialist”
viewed his attack on the Helvetians as his first step towards conquering all of Gaul,14
which is not what Caesar leads his readers to believe. Caesar seeks to justify his
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actions in Book I with a pro-Roman style, and Sherwin-White wanted readers to
understand that Caesar’s intentions were clear from the start of his proconsulship.15
Christina Kraus would agree about Caesar being an imperialist, but her 2009 work
“Bellum Gallicum” focused more on how Caesar portrays himself. She noted that
Caesar does act for the Roman people and that Caesar promotes himself as a general
who is responding to threats against his home,16 not so much as a commander driven
by greed.
Some scholars such as Lukas de Blois take Caesar precisely at his word and
approach understanding him in the manner which Caesar encouraged. In his 2017
essay “Caesar the General and Leader” De Blois determined that Caesar excelled at
what he calls “routine matters” for a general.17 Specifically, Caesar had a great
understanding of their importance of his troops and how their training and happiness
directly led to his success.18 There is no doubt that Caesar was well-liked among his
subordinates, and although De Blois’s essay is unnecessarily pro-Caesar, his
argument follows reliable evidence.
More specifically, two works concerning Caesar’s generalship are of
particular interest. In 2013, Michael Boring wrote his dissertation “The Generalship
of Caesar in Gaul” focusing on how Caesar conducted his Gallic campaign. He
considered Cicero’s necessary qualities for a general: valor, authority, good fortune,
and knowledge of military affairs, and how they are present in Caesar’s account of
the Gallic War.19 Kyle Johnson, writing a year earlier in 2012, did not focus on
specific attributes of Caesar but rather how he differed from his enemy in his
dissertation “Ethics of Leadership: Organization and Decision-Making in Caesar’s
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‘Bellum Gallicum.’”20 He noted that Caesar excelled in communicated practices,
relaying messages through his tribunes and centurions effectively, as well as winning
over the Gallic tribes and his own soldiers through his speeches.21 Caesar always
appears to be able to overcome any obstacle, terrain, army size, etc., and earn a
victory over his opponents.22
The scholarship on Caesar mainly focuses on his own work and how both
Romans and previous scholars viewed it. Many analyze the battles and their
outcomes, while others seek to rebuke his writings and take a more critical stance.
While not all of it is relevant for the present work, examining new perspectives to
gain a greater understanding of Caesar and his writings in general is always useful.
Book I of De Bello Gallico offers much more to any reader than its surface presents.
Conducting a proper analysis of the available scholarship allows us to become better
acquainted with who he was and his importance.

Review of Scholarship: Vegetius
Military handbooks from the ancient world—manuscripts concerning military
affairs such as strategies, armies, and importantly for this thesis, generalship—are in
short supply for today’s classicists. Little remain from ancient Rome, perhaps the
most notable being Frontinus’s Strategemata, written in the end of the first century
AD. Although extensive, it is more a historical analysis rather than a serious study on
how one should be a general.23 Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, writing in the late
4th century, however, created a work that focused on military affairs and Roman
warfare, and it included comments on proper generalship. Although the scholarship
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covering Vegetius is not as vast as that which covers Caesar, that does not make it
any less important. Specifically, this thesis needs to understand what Vegetius deems
necessary for a Roman general in order to form a definition of proper Roman
generalship.
Brian Campbell described two categories for military handbooks in his 1987
article “Teach Yourself How to be a General:” precepts on strategy and tactics, and
technical accounts of drill, formation, and weaponry.24 The writings of Vegetius seem
to address both of these categories, which strengthens the use of his manual as a valid
source for what makes a general. Campbell noted how the RM focuses on the Roman
army from before Vegetius’ time, that of the late Republic and early Principate.25
This further justifies the use of RM here since it refers to an army that would have
been similar to the one Caesar led. Charles Shrader, in his 1981 article, “The
Influence of Vegetius’ De Rei Militari,” considered how Vegetius used previous
sources for making his handbook, which would explain why Vegetius promoted the
Roman army of the early Principate as an ideal version.26 For Schrader, The RM as a
military handbook was comparable to Cicero’s works on ethics and philosophy for
Shrader.27 He clearly rated it highly and justified its use as a standard for generalship.
Recruitment was an important topic in RM. In his 2010 article, “Unseemly
Professions and Recruitment in Late Antiquity: Piscatores and Vegetius Epitoma 1.71-2,” Michael Charles took note of how Vegetius wanted a Rome that was protected
by Romans again, arguing that even if numbers were smaller, the army would be
superior to untrained hordes.28 Much of Charles’ work, however, focused on the
unfounded belief of Vegetius that piscatores should not be allowed to serve in his
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version of the Roman army29, which does not concern the argument this thesis seeks
to make. Mackay covered recruitment during Caesar’s time in The Landmark Caesar
published in 2017, which more or less aligns with the beliefs of Vegetius concerning
recruitment. He explained that most recruits during Caesar’s time came from rural
populations and were from the poorest citizens. They should be Roman citizens, or at
least from the allied colonies.30 He also covered the organization of the legions and
their chain of command, making it easier to understand how Caesar describes his
army in the BG.

Statement of Methodology
Vegetius’s work is an extensive treatise regarding what he considered
important for any military. Although he did not provide a direct definition of which
qualities and actions he considered necessary for a Roman general, it is possible to
form one based on his writings on the values and processes every Roman general
should adhere to.
Books I and III of RM provide the most insight to forming such a definition.
Book I focuses primarily on recruitment, something that a general would surely
oversee. In the very first chapter of Book I, Vegetius states the importance of
recruitment, explaining how Rome conquered so many people:
Sed adversus omnia profuit tironem sollerter eligere, ius, ut ita dixerim,
armorum docere, cotidiano exercitio roborare quaecumque evenire in acie
atque proeliis possunt, omnia in campestri meditatione praenoscere, severe in
desides vindicare.31
But what succeeded against all of them was careful selection of recruits,
instruction in the rules, so to speak, of war, toughening in daily exercises,
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prior acquaintance in field practice with all possible eventualities in war and
battle, and strict punishment of cowardice.32
This is the first task of a general and arguably the most important, since recruiting the
right soldiers is essential for forming a well-trained army.
After recruitment, Vegetius discussed at length the logistical challenges a
general must overcome in order to be successful. Specifically, training soldiers to be
disciplined, marching their troops effectively, encouraging them to fight
courageously, and keeping them fed were all necessary for a general.33 Based on this,
the welfare of the soldiers are the direct responsibility of the general. Vegetius also
uses specific words to describe an ideal general, writing, Dux itaque vigilans sobrius
prudens.34 He writes that a general should be watchful, sober, and discreet, three
oddly specific words, which seem to summarize how a general should conduct
themselves before entering battle. Based on the information above, forming a
definition of an ideal Roman general, in the eyes of Vegetius, becomes possible. A
proper Roman general must be able to carry out all logistical challenges of running an
army, such as recruiting the right soldiers, implementing discipline, and feeding
troops, as well as positioning the army to win any battle, provide any needed
encouragement, and remain sober, watchful, and discreet before battle. Adhering to
these traits will result in a victory for the general.

The Argument
Caesar demonstrates exemplary generalship in BG, much of which
corresponds to a definition of generalship based on Vegetius. This is not something
that scholars have studied extensively. Roman history spans many centuries and
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finding ways to connect different time periods adds insight to Roman culture. this
work will prove that qualities of leadership and generalship demonstrated by Julius
Caesar in Book 1 of BG correspond to the qualities that Vegetius describes as
necessary for a Roman general in his RM, written 400 years later.

Analysis
The scholarship that covers Caesar mostly views him as an effective general.
That which examines Vegetius is useful for gaining a better understanding of the RM,
and thus aiding in the formation of a definition of generalship. Before explaining the
content of the RM, we must first address Vegetius’s sources. He produced his
manuscript not from experience in military affairs, but from studying earlier Roman
commentaries.35 Although he does not mention Caesar by name, but considering he
studied commenters on military affairs closely,36 and thus was likely very aware of
the context of Caesar’s commentaries. Therefore, it follows logically that his
descriptions of proper generalship correspond to the actions of Caesar.
This paper’s analysis will contribute to Classical scholarship concerning both
Caesar and Vegetius. If Vegetius modelled a general on Caesar, which he never
claimed to do, it would also still enhance the knowledge surrounding Vegetius.
Making connections to preceding authors is common for many ancient writers, and
Vegetius displays the importance late Republican writers still carried even into the
late Roman Empire. If Vegetius read Caesar, then he should model an ideal general
on someone as accomplished as Caesar. This thesis will demonstrate that there are
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clear connections between Caesar and the writing of Vegetius, which the author
hopes will benefit the study of Classics whether Vegetius read Caesar or not.

Content of RM
In order to compare the leadership of Caesar to Vegetius’s definition of
leadership, a careful reading of the RM is necessary in order to bring to light what
qualities are necessary for a Roman general. The first chapter itself emphasizes the
need of a general to recruit adequate soldiers and train them properly. Vegetius states
clearly that a well-trained group of soldiers will always be victorious over massive,
inept hordes of men.37A general’s focus should not be on the amount of people they
have under their command, but rather who they have under their command. A well
trained soldier will fight harder and demonstrate greater courage in battle,38 and
certainly that training must originate from the general.
Concerning what type of person a general recruits, however, Vegetius’s
statements are less clear. There are 28 chapters in Book I of RM, and 2-7 concern
what type of person a general should recruit. For example, he says that soldiers who
live closer to the sun will have less blood and therefore be more scared of an enemy
soldier wounding them in battle.39 A bizarre comment to say the least. Then there is
the section where he states that fishermen, fowlers, pastrycooks, and weavers should
“be banned far from camp.”40 Michael Charles tackled this issue in his article, and it
appears that Vegetius formed this belief from reading the likes of Cicero, so there is
some merit to the statement for the time period. 41 Vegetius also claims to know that
Roman soldiers during the early Principate needed to be about 5 ft. 11 in., and about 5
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ft. 9 in. for the cavalry.42 He continues on to his point that the rural populace would
make for better soldiers than the urban, but no general should turn away an urban
citizen during a time of need.43 Recruitment is the first task a general needs to
accomplish for his army, and clearly it was an important aspect in the eyes of
Vegetius.
Book III is the most important chapter of RM for the present definition of
leadership. Chapter four concerns mutinies and how to ensure soldiers do not revolt
against their general. Vegetius spends most of the chapter listing various means of
punishment or drills that commanders can force upon their men in order to distract
them from the idea of mutiny or revolt. But according to Vegetius, that is not
sufficient enough for a great general. A general should not have to bestow fear among
their soldiers in order to force them into submission. Discipline is key in controlling
an army, and a general as is the one responsible for forming that discipline.
Marching is a crucial aspect of generalship, as Vegetius explained in chapter
six of Book III. Less thought of than battle, the march is arguably just as important as
any actual coordinated fighting, since a soldier is more vulnerable to attacks while
marching, thus it is the responsibility of the general that they do not suffer any attacks
or at minimum repel attacks without a loss.44 This section is extensive, marking the
importance of it in Vegetius’s eyes. Certainly, a competent general must be able to
manage his troops properly to march safely and efficiently in order to keep them safe
and in the best position to win any battle.
Vegetius’s writings on marching make it clear that the pre-battle preparation
is important for any general to maintain. He continued in Book III to comment on the
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knowledge required of a general in order to be successful in battle. For Vegetius, a
general needs to be knowledgeable about the enemy, gathering all known
information, from any subordinate who has information on the enemy.45 This is vital
for any general, as knowing qualities such as the size, arms, food supply, and courage
of the enemy will influence any decision to enter battle. According to Vegetius,
whether a general leads with cavalry or infantry, or prolongs the war or hastens
through it, depends on his knowledge of the adversary.46
According to Vegetius, the general is directly responsible for the attitudes of
the soldiers. He is unambiguous in his writings concerning the general’s role to raise
the army’s spirits. He wrote clearly that:
Desperantibus autem crescit audacia adhortatione ducis et, si nihil ipse timere
videatur, crescit animus.47
When the men despair, their courage is raised by an address from the general,
and if he appears fearless himself, their spirits are raised.48
A general must lead by example because if he cannot fight then how can he expect his
soldiers to do so? No battle is without hardships, and it is the general’s responsibility
to motivate his men to overcome any difficulty or fear.
Less renowned but equally important to any other duty of a general is keeping
his army well fed. This was no small task, considering Caesar’s armies could have
ranged anywhere from 20,000-40,000 men during his Gallic campaigns.49 This
necessity was not lost on Vegetius, who put it brilliantly that a general should
consider
Cui magis victus abundet aut desit; nam fames, ut dicitur, intrinsecus pugnat
et vincit saepius sine ferro.50

16
Which side has more food or lacks it, for hunger, they say, fights from within
and often conquers without a blow.51

A general must concern himself with much more than simply winning a battle. He is
responsible for an entire army of men that needs to be fed properly or else they will
face the consequences of malnutrition and in the worst cases death.
The final key points of Vegetius concern specific attributes a general must
possess. Vegetius uses the adjectives vigilans, sobrius, and prudens to describe an
ideal general.52 The words ordinarily translate as watchful, sober, and wise
respectively. Watchful is understandable, since a general should be constantly aware
of their surroundings and situation. But sober is more interesting. Vegetius most
likely wanted to imply that a general needed to be calm in order to make the right
decision. Considering prudens, N. P. Milner translated it as discreet, not wise.
Perhaps Vegetius sought to describe the general’s tone of speaking and wanted to
convey the idea of addressing people in an endearing and respectable manner.
Furthermore, a proper general will always concern themselves with the welfare of
each and every one of their soldiers.53 Whatever may happen to a solider in war, the
general must take responsibility for it.

Content of BG Book I
Book I of BG features some of Caesar’s most notable experiences during his
conquest of Gaul. Considering Caesar wrote this commentary himself, it is important
to understand that his explanations of the events are favorable towards him and his
goals. As Rosenstein explains, Caesar was in fact a product of the Roman world, he
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was expected to earn victories and do so in an honorable fashion.54 It is because of
this that although the present argument will analyze Caesar’s writings word for word
in order to understand his leadership, it will do so with careful consideration of the
purpose in writing. As previously stated on page 5, the ancient sources mostly agree
that Caesar’s retellings are just, and clearly the victories he earned were not imagined.
After an overview of Gaul, the first event in Book I is Caesar’s battle with the
Helvetians. According to Caesar, Roman allies in Gaul were having their villages
ravaged by the Helvetians, which is what prompted Caesar to attack them.55 He is
careful not to fall for initial temptations to attack them, but instead carefully plans so
that he can prevent further devastation to his allies and his army, while putting
himself in the best possible position to gain victory. After rousing his soldiers with a
speech, he gains his first victory in Gaul by defeating the Helvetians.56 His leadership
is already on display with his first victory, an ability to motivate his men, and his
insurance of their safety.
Following this victory, Caesar introduced his readers to Ariovistus, his main
adversary in Book I. Gallic chieftains express concern over Ariovistus and his army
of Germany soldiers, which prompts Caesar to take action. His soldiers, however, are
much less excited after learning not only of the number of soldiers under Ariovistus’s
command, but also how immense each individual soldier is compared to them.57 This
leads to the next episode in Book I: the near-mutiny of 58 BCE. Consequently, the
reader also gains insight into the hierarchy of power in Caesar’s army, since the
soldiers complain up the chain of command. This scene is one of the most notable in
all of the BG. Caesar gathers his centurions, informs them of previous victories,
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reminds them of their abilities, and ignores their request by stating he will march with
his tenth legion no matter their decision, but that they are to do what they think it
right.58 No punishments took place, no soldier was executed or exiled from Rome,
Caesar simply reminded them of who they are and trusted his men to make the right
decision. The centurions rallied their subordinates, and the army marched towards
Ariovistus.
The final scene of Book I is the battle with Ariovistus. Like the battle with the
Helvetians, Caesar’s generalship is on top display in this engagement. He marches his
army in order to keep them safe by not engaging in minor, meaningless skirmishes,59
which inspired his army to keep fighting since they knew Caesar had their interests at
heart. Eventually, Caesar organizes his army in the best position possible and engaged
Ariovistus when he saw an opening. His troops attacked fiercely, Caesar wrote, and
they drove off the German forces.60 Before the summer finished, Caesar had
completed two campaigns and held off a mutiny. Book I bears witness to some of
Caesar’s finest work as a general.

Battle with The Helvetians
Caesar’s campaign against the Helvetians, his first of his eventual conquest of
Gaul, came about as a reaction to their recent attacks on other Gallic tribes. Caesar
explains that Roman allies in Gaul requested his aid after the Helvetians destroyed
their villages, planning to settle in southern France.61 As a Roman general, Caesar
needed to act with Rome’s interest first, so plunging into a careless battle with
Helvetians would not be in his best interest. In order for his term as Proconsul of
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Transalpine Gaul to further his personal goals as a Roman politician, Caesar would
need victories against worthwhile opponents. Since Rome had many allies in Gaul,
protecting them was justifiable cause to attack the Helvetians, which he would do so
cautiously.
The scholarship concerning this scene is more or less in agreement with
Caesar. Overall, Caesar’s actions bore a net positive for the Gallic tribes.62 The fact
that there is essentially no disapproval of any critics that were closer than Vegetius to
Caesar’s time, including Plutarch (AD 46-c. 120), Dio Cassius (AD 150-235), Appian
(c. AD 160), or Suetonius (born c. AD 70), further justify this.63 Often, anyone
writing during the time of a dictator will always view the person in charge favorably,
but each of those historians wrote well after Caesar’s death. Furthermore, the
Helvetians acted spontaneously, as no agreement was made for them to pass through
Gallic lands, let alone any justifiable motivation to destroy the villages as they passed
through.64 Concerning why the engagement took place, more than just for glory and
loot, Caesar’s actions follow accordingly with Roman ideology.
Caesar displays exceptional leadership during his campaign against the
Helvetians. What is most clearly on display is not necessarily Caesar’s fighting
ability, but the planning and careful analysis that he uses before a battle. He does not
fall for any temptations from the Helvetians to engage in worthless skirmishes, but
rather focuses on preventing any further devastation to local villages.65 He manages
his army so that they are not only safe during their pursuit, but also focused on
reaching their eventual goal of beating the Helvetians in battle.
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Caesar’s descriptions of the battle are brief and directly to the point. He does
not write out his speech to his soldiers for the audience, nor does he explain in detail
each and every scene from the battle. This is because Caesar was not in all places at
once. He had a specific view of the battle, but all other views he needed to gather
from his men. Lendon explains this as a type of art: Caesar needed to create
descriptions for scenes he did not see and form them into a narrative that his readers
could follow.66 Any reader needs to consider this when trying to pick apart Caesar’s
writings in order to find answers to how he was able to be successful.
Based on Caesar, the most important reason for his victory was simply having
better trained soldiers than the Helvetians. Caesar’s descriptions of the battle are
broad and do not single out any one person for heroism or even himself. Caesar
instead provides events and numbers for his readers, allowing them to paint a picture
in their mind of what is happening. He uses whole lines of soldiers or divisions of his
army to describe the events of the battle, emphasizing the importance of all the
soldiers under his command. Caesar set his infantry up on higher ground, withdrew
himself and the cavalry so the Helvetians would think they are evenly matched, then
his legionaries threw javelins and charged.67 The battle begins around 7:00 AM and
continues long into the night as the Helvetians retreat to a rearguard of 15,000 men,
which still is not enough to hold back the Roman attack.68
Considering the abilities of Caesar’s soldiers, it is clear that he satisfies the
need of a general to recruit the right soldiers based on the RM. These battles consisted
of tens of thousands of soldiers for each side, making organization and training
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crucial for the army to be productive. This importance is at the forefront of the RM,
considering Vegetius begins the first chapter of Book I:
In omni autem proelio non tam multitudo et virtus indocta quam ars et
exercitium solent praestare victoriam. Nulla enim alia re videmus populum
Romanum orbem subegisse terrarum nisi armorum exercitio, disciplina
castorum usuque militiae.”69
In every battle it is not numbers and untaught bravery so much as skill and
training that generally produce the victory. For we see no other explanation of
the conquest of the world by the Roman people than their drill-at-arms, campdiscipline and military expertise.70
A well-trained army will always fair better than one only greater in number. Vegetius
also notes that a true Roman army should consist of primarily Romans, which is
something Caesar’s initial forces followed. Indeed, Caesar himself does not leave out
from his own writings the auxiliary troops he recruited in the province of Gaul. At the
start of BG, he writes Procinciae toti quam maximum potest militum munerum
imperat. Caesar requisitioned as many troops from Gaul as he could, which turned
out to be about one legion.71 But most of his recruits did in fact come from Italy and
her immediate allies.72 Caesar describes how he enrolled three legions out of winter
quarters in Aquileia, which gave him five legions to march towards the Helvetians.73
Caesar also spends a significant portion of this episode on the food supply for
his soldiers. Before the main battle was fought, Caesar toils over the incompetence of
the Aedui, one of the Gallic tribes, with supplying food for his army. After pressuring
them to supply the promised food multiple times, he recognizes that something is
wrong and carries out an investigation that leads him to condemning one of their
leaders, Dumnorix,74 for siding with the Helvetians and keeping grain from the
Romans.75 Although Caesar wants to punish Dumnorix, he spares his life out of
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respect for his brother Diviacus, who was another leader of the Aedui that was instead
very loyal to Rome.76 His detective work complete, Caesar re-established the grain
supply from the Aedui and once again proved himself as an adequate general in the
eyes of Vegetius because of this.

Battle with Ariovistus and the Near Mutiny
Caesar’s next campaign features two important demonstrations of his
leadership: the mutiny of 57 BCE and his battle with Ariovistus. After his battle with
the Helvetians, the Roman allies in Gaul expressed concern over an increasingly
dangerous man, Ariovistus. Loyal to Roman allies, Caesar takes these concerns
seriously and vowed to help alleviate their fear.77 It appears that Caesar highly valued
relationships. He did not try to raze the entire area of Gaul into submission, but rather
worked with whom he could in order to establish a foundation in which the area could
become a sound province of Rome.
His loyalty to the Gallic tribes that were allies with Rome becomes more clear
through his letter to Ariovistus. Before setting his army out to seek battle, Caesar
exchanged letters with Ariovistus in hope of reaching a middle ground that could
avoid fighting and blood loss. This letter outlined requests such as the returning of
hostages and permission for safe passage of the Aedui in land that was formerly
theirs, all in return for a peaceful and beneficial relationship between Ariovistus and
Rome.78 What Caesar makes clear through this simple and unfortunately unsuccessful
deliberation is his willingness to act on behalf of the Gallic tribes. Whether or not he

23
had their interests at heart, Caesar’s considerations for the needs of the Gauls are
important when understanding his campaigns and therefore his leadership.
The Mutiny of 48 BCE was the first test of Caesar’s actual command over his
army. The events in Book I of BG occur quickly, with the mutiny happening shortly
after Caesar’s victory over the Helvetians. Considering their convincing victory, why
would Caesar’s soldiers suddenly become skeptical of their leader and ability to earn
victory over Ariovistus? Caesar explained it clearly:
Ex percontatione nostrorum vocibusque Gallorum ac mercatorum, qui ingenti
megnitudine corproum Germanos, incredibili virtute atque exercitatione in
armis esse praedicabant.79
A panic arose from inquiries made by our troops and remarks uttered by Gauls
and traders, who affirmed that the Germans were men of a mighty frame and
an incredible valor and skill at arms.80
The rumors of the Germans’ might have warranted fear for any soldier. Surely, any
rational person should refrain from marching towards imminent death, so why should
Caesar’s soldiers be any different?
Caesar’s response to the mutiny demonstrates the greatness of his leadership.
After receiving word that his soldiers, inundated with fear, began either signing their
wills, asking Caesar’s permission to leave, or simple stating they would disobey any
command to continue marching, Caesar wasted no time in taking action.81 Having
gathered his centurions, Caesar gave them an iconic speech, perhaps the most notable
portion being the ending remark:
Suam innocentiam perpetua vita, felicitatem Helvetiorum bello esse
perspectam. Itaque se quod in longiorem diem collaturus fuisset
repraesentaturum et proxima nocte de quarta vigilia castra monturum, ut quam
primum intellegere posset, utrum apud eos pudor atque officium an timor
valeret. Quod si praeterea nemo sequitur, tamen se cum sola decima legion
iturum,, de qua non dubitaret, sibique eam praetoriam cohortem furturam.82
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My own blamelessness has been clearly seen throughout my life, my good
fortune in the Helvetian campaign. Accordingly I intend to execute at once
what I might have put off to a more distant day, and to break camp in the
fourth watch of this next night, to the intent that I may perceive at once
whether honor and duty, or cowardice, prevail in your minds. Even if no one
else follows, I shall march with the Tenth legion alone; I have no doubt of its
allegiance, and it will furnish the commander’s escort.83
What is most noteworthy is that Caesar makes no soldier do anything. He trusts that
his men will follow him because he believes they all value loyalty and courage.
Caesar displays the mark of a true general, leading by example and treating his
trained soldiers as responsible men rather than raw recruits in need of discipline.
Caesar does not demonstrate many of the techniques Vegetius covers
concerning what to do in the case of a mutiny. Vegetius does recommend generals
learn of the true facts of the mutiny from higher ranks,84 which Caesar does with
gathering his centurions. But his ideas such as having soldiers practice basic skills,
holding standards, cutting trees, or basically training them to exhaustion,85 are not
part of Caesar’s strategy. Nor does Caesar separate his army in order to break them
apart and make their combined force weaker, and he certainly does not punish any
“ringleaders” of the mutiny through death in order to instill fear.
Caesar instead relies on the discipline he knows that he instilled in his men in
order to overcome this fear. Vegetius’s section on mutinies is nearly forsaken in the
BG, with the exception of the last sentence:
Laudabiliores tamen duces sunt, quorum exercitum ad modestiam labor et
usus instituit quam illi quorum milites ad oboedientiam suppliciorum formido
conpellit.86
However, those generals who have instilled discipline in their army through
hard work and routine are more praiseworthy than those whose soldiers are
forced into submission by fear of punishment.87
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It is evident that at no point Caesar forces his army into submission, but rather relies
on his own trust of their courage in order to suppress the mutiny. Perhaps this is a
reach, but Vegetius’s value of discipline is indisputable, and once Caesar reminded
his men of their accomplishments, they were quick to remember their abilities and
training and rediscovered their trust of their general. It must have helped that he also
gave praise towards the 10th legion, which could certainly have played at the
competitiveness of his soldiers. Who would want to be outdone in courage and
loyalty while Caesar, known for his generosity towards his troops, was watching?
The battle against Ariovistus would prove to be Caesar’s greatest triumph in
Book I of BG. Combined with his ability to suppress the mutiny, he displayed
exemplary generalship during the whole sequence of events. His first task was to put
his troops in the best position possible for battle. After Ariovistus moved his army six
miles from Caesar’s camp, he marched most of his soldiers, arming two of the three
lines in case they were attacked, to a new location about 600 paces from the German
camp.88 This allowed him to keep his grain supply connected and also set up his
soldiers in a more ideal location to enter battle. He understood the danger of marching
closely to the enemy, taking the precaution of keeping his soldiers armed during the
march and building of the new camp.
The courage of Caesar’s soldiers won him a decisive victory over Ariovistus.
After a few days of skirmishes while Caesar organized his army, he decided to lead
his soldiers to the field of battle, he himself proceeding close to the enemy camp, in
order to draw out Ariovistus’s German army. Caesar placed a lieutenant in charge of
each legion, and after taking command of one himself, his troops attacked.89 His
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description of what happened next is brief, but he signals out the bravery of his men,
explaining:
Reperti sunt complures nostril milites, qui phalangas insilirent et scuta
minibus revellerent et desuper vulnerarent.90
Not a few of our soldiers were found brave enough to leap on to the masses of
the enemy, tear the shields from their hands, and deal a wound from above.91
His once fearful men were willing to leap into the German masses, effectively too.
This, coupled with the quick reaction of P. Crassus to deploy his third line to a
pressing German flank, caused the enemy to run away and retreat.92
There are various qualities of a general that Caesar displays during this battle.
Decision making lies at the base of Vegetius’s beliefs for a general. A general should
reasonably care about the welfare of each soldier and put them in the best position to
win.93 Caesar did this in two ways during his campaign against Ariovistus. First, he
sets his army up in two camps, allowing him closer proximity to the enemy and better
positioning them to set up for battle. Second, he forms his battle line first. This
allowed him to decide the optimal moment to attack, which occurred when Caesar’s
close proximity to the German camp forced them to meet him on the field.94 During
this entire scene, Caesar evaluated his situation carefully and always puts his soldiers
interests first. He understands that he cannot be successful if his men are not safe,
which is why he focuses so much on putting them in the best position to be victorious
in battle.
Although it does not receive as extensive coverage as it did with the
Helvetians, Caesar again made it clear that the grain supply is important to him. He
makes a quick note of securing the grain supply before he starts his initial pursuit of
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Ariovistus, stopping at Vesontio for a few days to resupply.95 Later, when Caesar
moves his camp past that of Ariovistus, part of his reasoning is to secure the supply
train of grain so that his army can be well-fed for battle.96 Before any fighting takes
place, Caesar again focused on his soldiers health, making sure that they are well fed
and prepared for battle. During each main battle in Book I, Caesar notably included
his concern for supplying his soldiers with food, displaying his care for the men and
ability to set his army up in the best position to win.

Conclusion
There is clear evidence that the qualities that a general should possess based
on RM are present in Caesar in Book I of BG. Although Vegetius is writing about
400 years after Caesar, it is possible to find connections within their writings.
Vegetius was specific about everything a general needed to do in order to be
effective. He hardly minced words concerning their responsibility to supply men with
food, always to be cautious when marching their troops, and to acquire as much
knowledge as possible about the enemy.
Book I of BG bears witness to one of his most notable enemies, Ariovistus, as
well as two critical episodes in his career, the battle with the Helvetians and the
mutiny in 48 BCE. These scenes provide excellent insight into how Caesar handled
and planned for various situations. His ability to encourage men to fight coupled with
the careful consideration for their well-being make Book I of BG a great example of
his generalship. Caesar demonstrates through his writing how he was able to be such
an effective general.
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RM is an extensive treatise on military affairs; it covers far more than Caesar
could have demonstrated in BG. But Caesar captured many its key aspects. His Gallic
campaigns reshaped the geography of Rome, something that would not have been
possible if he were an inadequate general. The connections he makes to Vegetius’s
handbook are important and display the power of his legacy.
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